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AN EQUAL PLAYING FIELD: THE 
POTENTIAL CONFLICT BETWEEN TITLE 
IX & THE MASSACHUSETTS EQUAL 
RIGHTS AMENDMENT 
Christopher Marquis* 
Abstract: In 2012 the Department of Education received a complaint 
claiming that the Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Association’s 
(“MIAA”) policy of allowing boys to try out for girls’ field hockey consti-
tuted a violation of Title IX. This federal statute prohibits discrimina-
tion in educational institutions on the basis of sex. This Note looks at 
the common roots of Title IX and the decision of the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court that allowed boys’ participation in field hockey. It 
then examines Title IX as it applies to the MIAA field hockey policy and 
determines that the Massachusetts Policy does not, in and of itself, cre-
ate a violation. This Note further suggests that even if the policy did vio-
late Title IX, policy implications suggest that using Title IX to invalidate 
another provision designed to promote gender equality is unwise. Fi-
nally, this Note identifies a number of gender-neutral alternatives to 
deal with the legitimate problems posed by the participation of boys in 
what are traditionally girls’ sports. 
Introduction 
 In the 2010 Western Massachusetts field hockey Division I title 
game a forward for South Hadley High School collided at full speed 
with the opposing goaltender, Corey Hedges, scoring the winning 
goal.1 What differentiated this play from many others in field hockey 
is that the forward who scored the goal was an eighteen-year-old male 
named Ben Menard.2 In addition to playing field hockey, Ben Menard 
                                                                                                                      
* Executive Articles Editor, Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice 
(2013–2014). 
1 Mike Cullity, Equal Rights vs. Title IX: Massachusetts Law Allows Boys To Compete Against 
Girls in Several Sports, ESPN ( June 15, 2012), http://espn.go.com/high-school/girl/story/ 
_/id/8055704/massachusetts-era-allows-boys-compete-girls-sports-such-field-hockey-
swimming-volleyball-gymnastics. 
2 Id. 
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also played varsity ice hockey and lacrosse.3 Not only did he score the 
game’s winning goal, but he also turned into one of the best players 
in the history of Western Massachusetts field hockey.4 Corey Hedges, 
an eighteen-year-old female, on the other hand, suffered a concussion 
on the play, which resulted in severe headaches for six months.5 
 Although many states do not permit boys to play on girls’ field 
hockey teams, the Massachusetts Equal Rights Amendment (“ERA”) 
requires the state’s sports teams allow boys to try out for girls’ teams.6 
The ERA states that “equality under the law shall not be denied or 
abridged on account of sex . . . .” and the Massachusetts Supreme Ju-
dicial Court has interpreted this as requiring a strict scrutiny analysis 
to classifications based on sex, determining that any other level of 
analysis would negate the purpose of the amendment in light of fed-
eral equal protection law.7 Strict scrutiny, the most rigorous type of 
constitutional examination, requires a state action to be narrowly tai-
lored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.8 
 Ben Menard and Corey Hedges represent the perfect storm of 
concerns that have led other states to ban the participation of boys on 
girls’ field hockey teams.9 By the time they hit adolescence, physio-
logical differences between boys and girls in areas such as speed, size, 
and strength can give boys an advantage in certain athletic competi-
                                                                                                                      
3 Bill Wells, Brothers Ben and Chris Menard Have South Hadley in Position to Win Its First State 
Title, Masslive.com (Nov. 16, 2010), http://highschoolsports.masslive.com/news/article/-
5363953520758910594/brothers-ben-and-chris-menard-have-south-hadley-field-hockey-in-posi 
tion-to-win-its-first-state-title. 
4 Id. 
5 Cullity, supra note 1. 
6 Mass. Const. pt. 1, art. I (“Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged 
because of sex, race, color, creed or national origin.”); Attorney Gen. v. Mass. Interscholas-
tic Athletic Ass’n (MIAA), 393 N.E.2d 284, 290 (Mass. 1979) (holding that an absolute ban 
on boys participating in girls’ sports where there was no corresponding boys team violated 
the Massachusetts Equal Rights Amendment). 
7 Mass. Const. pt. 1, art. I; Opinion of Justices to the House of Representatives, 371 
N.E.2d 426, 428 (Mass. 1977). Since Federal Equal Protection law applies an intermediate 
scrutiny analysis to laws which classify on the basis of gender, if the same level of analysis 
was given to the Massachusetts Equal Protection Amendment it would not provide any 
additional legal protection to gender classifications. See Opinion of Justices to the House of 
Representatives, 371 N.E.2d at 428. 
8 Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005); see Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 
432–33 (1984); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
9 See MIAA, 393 N.E.2d at 293 (noting defendant’s argument that sex based exclusions 
in sports were necessary to protect players’ safety); Petrie v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 394 N.E.2d 
855, 861 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (noting that the physical differences between adolescent boys 
and girls give boys an advantage in sports). 
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tions.10 Opponents of boys playing in girls’ sports argue that allowing 
such participation would lead to boys dominating the sport.11 They 
also argue that boys’ participation in girls’ sports raises safety con-
cerns and could lead to reduced opportunities for athletic participa-
tion by girls.12 
 This debate recently came to a head when the United States De-
partment of Education, Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”) received a 
complaint filed against the Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic As-
sociation (“MIAA”).13 The complaint claims violations of Title IX of 
the Education Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”).14 Specifically, the 
complaint alleges that “girls on the mixed gender teams are being 
displaced from full participation and girls on the opposing teams are 
in the unfair position of being dominated or placed at greater risk of 
injury by the physical prowess of the male athlete.”15 In short, this ar-
gument alleges that male participation in traditionally female sports 
reduces athletic opportunities for girls and violates the effective ac-
commodation regulations of Title IX.16 Title IX, among other provi-
sions, requires that schools take steps to meet the athletic interests of 
members of both sexes.17 This allegation sets up an interesting con-
flict between two laws designed to protect gender equality.18 
                                                                                                                      
10 See Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164, 169 (D. Colo. 1977) (“[T]he evidence in 
this case has shown that males as a class tend to have an advantage in strength and speed 
over females as a class and that a collision between a male and a female would tend to be 
to the disadvantage of the female.”); MIAA, 393 N.E.2d at 293 (“No doubt biological cir-
cumstance does contribute to some overall male advantages.”); Cambridge Encyclopedia 
of Human Growth and Development 249–50 (Stanley J. Ulijaszek et al. eds., 1998) 
(“[S]ex differences in motor performance become marked during adolescence, such that 
few girls perform as well as average boys in many strength, power and speed tasks in later 
adolescence.”); Ellen W. Gerber et al., The American Woman in Sport 426, 429, 450 
(1974). 
11 See Williams v. Sch. Dist. of Bethlehem, 998 F.2d 168, 178 (3d Cir. 1993); MIAA, 393 
N.E.2d at 294. 
12 Cullity supra note 1 (“While boys potentially can displace girls from high school 
teams or rob them of playing time, there are also safety concerns in contact sports such as 
field hockey, as the Menard-Hedges collision highlights.”); see Hoover, 430 F. Supp. at 169; 
MIAA, 393 N.E.2d at 294. 
13 Complaint filed with the Department of Education, No. 01-12-4015 at 1( July 22, 
2012) [hereinafter Complaint] (on file with author); Bob Holmes, Complaint Filed over Field 
Hockey, Bos. Globe, Sept. 28, 2012, at C14. 
14 See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006); Complaint, supra note 13, at 5; Holmes, supra note 13. 
15 Complaint, supra note 13, at 5. 
16 See id. 
17 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1) (2012) (“Whether the selection of sports and levels of 
competition effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes . 
. . .”); Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; a Policy Interpretation; Title IX and 
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 The Department of Education (“DOE”) regulations under Title 
IX require schools to allow women to try out for most athletic teams, 
even many traditional men’s teams.19 Contact sports, including field 
hockey, are exempt from the tryout requirement.20 While precedents 
largely indicate that Title IX does not require that boys be allowed to 
try out for girls’ field hockey teams, the complaint filed with the OCR 
begs the question of whether the law actually bans boys from partici-
pating through the application of Title IX regulation’s effective ac-
commodation provision.21 
 This Note uses field hockey as a case study to demonstrate that 
MIAA policy allowing boys to try out for traditional girls’ sports as 
mandated by the Massachusetts ERA does not violate Title IX. Fur-
thermore, this Note suggests that the Massachusetts ERA and Title IX 
both are designed to further the same goals and that it is inconsistent 
to use Title IX to invalidate a more protective gender equality law that 
does not eliminate measures to ensure the safety and competitiveness 
                                                                                                                      
Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (Dec. 11, 1979); Complaint, supra 
note 13, at 5; Holmes, supra note 13. 
18 See Mass. Const. pt. 1, art. I; MIAA, 393 N.E.2d at 296 (holding that an absolute ban 
on boys participating in girls’ sports where there was no corresponding boys team violated 
the Massachusetts ERA); 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (“A recipient which operates or sponsors 
interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics shall provide equal athletic 
opportunity for members of both sexes.”); Legislative Research Council, Report Rel-
ative to the Equal Rights Constitutional Amendment, S. 1537 at 23 (Mass. 1972); 
Kate Cruikshank, The Art of Leadership: A Companion to an Exhibition from the 
Senatorial Papers of Birch Bayh 41–45 (2007). 
19 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b). Although the regulation does not apply specifically to women 
on its face, one of the stipulations for protection is that “opportunities for members of that 
sex have previously been limited.” Id. This regulation makes it very difficult for men to 
successfully use Title IX to require they be allowed to try out for women’s teams.; see Wil-
liams, 998 F.2d at 175 (finding that the question of limited athletic opportunities should be 
considered generally rather than specifically for each sport). 
20 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (“[M]embers of the excluded sex must be allowed to try out 
for the team offered unless the sport involved is a contact sport. For purposes of this part, 
contact sports include boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball and other 
sports the purpose or major activity of which involves bodily contact.”); see Kleczek v. R.I. 
Interscholastic League, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 951, 955–56 (D.R.I. 1991) (finding that the ma-
jor activity of field hockey involves bodily contact). 
21 See Williams, 998 F.2d at 174 (holding that 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) does not preclude a 
school from maintaining a sport for one sex only); Kleczek, 768 F. Supp. at 955–56 (holding 
that field hockey is a contact sport within the meaning of 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b), and thus 
boys did not have to be allowed to try out); 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (“A recipient which op-
erates or sponsors interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics shall provide 
equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes.”); Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,417–18 (“In the selection of sports, the regulation 
does not require institutions to integrate their teams nor to provide exactly the same 
choice of sports to men and women.”). 
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of female athletes, but only requires that such measures be gender-
neutral. Part I examines the requirements placed on athletic pro-
grams that receive federal funding by Title IX as well as the historical 
and policy justifications for Title IX and the Massachusetts ERA. Part 
II explores the interplay between the two laws and how the complaint 
is likely to be resolved. Part III argues that this application of the Mas-
sachusetts ERA does not violate Title IX, but rather, the amendment is 
aligned with the broader goals of the federal law. Additionally, it ar-
gues that as a matter of policy, Title IX should not be used to invali-
date a particular application of a state ERA. Finally, Part IV urges the 
use of alternative, non-gendered methods for protecting the safety 
and competitiveness of female sports such as placing restrictions on 
physically superior players or increasing the use of teams comprised 
of players from multiple schools. 
I. Federal & State Protections of Sexual Equality & Their 
Application to Athletics 
 In the early 1970s, government at both the federal and state lev-
els pushed to prevent discrimination against women as part of the 
women’s rights movement.22 Following on the heels of legislation that 
expanded protections for racial minorities in the 1960s and 1970s, 
leaders in the women’s rights movement scored legislative victories by 
passing federal and state laws that attempted to end sex discrimina-
tion.23 These laws included Title IX (“the Title”)—the federal law ad-
dressing sex discrimination in education—and the Massachusetts 
ERA.24 
                                                                                                                      
22 Legislative Research Council, supra note 18, at 23; see Cruikshank, supra note 
18, at 41–45 (2007); Leslie W. Gladstone, Congressional Research Service, Equal 
Rights Amendments: State Provisions 1–2 (2004). States which passed ERAs in the 
1970s are Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, and Washing-
ton. Gladstone, supra, at 3–6. California, Florida, Iowa, Utah, and Wyoming also passed 
ERAs but during different time periods. Id. 
23 See, e.g., Mass. Const. pt. 1, art. I; Tex. Const. art. I, § 3(a); Wash. Const. art. 
XXXI, § 1; 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006). Civil rights legislation of the 1960s included the pas-
sage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–2000 (2006) (providing a num-
ber of anti-discriminatory provisions including prohibitions on employment discrimina-
tion and discrimination in public accommodations). 
24 See Mass. Const. pt. 1, art. I; 20 U.S.C. § 1681. 
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A. Title IX & Its Protections for Women in Athletics 
 When Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it prohibited 
discrimination on the basis of religion, race, color, or national origin, 
but most of its provisions did not apply to discrimination based on 
sex.25 Recognizing the gap in policy, President Johnson included pro-
tections against discrimination of women in Executive Order 11,375 
in 1967.26 After its implementation, women’s rights advocates began 
using the executive order to combat discrimination in hiring practices 
at educational institutions.27 
 Senator Birch Bayh introduced Title IX as an amendment to the 
Higher Education Act of 1965 during the Act’s 1971 reauthoriza-
tion.28 The Title intended to provide equal opportunities for women 
in education.29 In order to accomplish this goal, Title IX states that 
“[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be ex-
cluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any education program or activity re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance.”30 
 The statutory language of Title IX does not directly discuss ath-
letic programs, but school athletics have become its most well-known 
                                                                                                                      
25 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–2000. The one major provision of the Civil Rights Act that 
does address sexual discrimination is Title VII, which prevents discrimination by employers 
on the basis of sex, as well as race, color, religion, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a). This provision may have included sex in an effort to defeat the entire bill by dissuad-
ing some of its supporters. Michael Evan Gold, A Tale of Two Amendments: The Reasons Con-
gress Added Sex to Title VII and Their Implication for the Issue of Comparable Worth, 19 Duq. L. 
Rev. 453, 453 (1980). 
26 See, e.g., Exec. Order 11,375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14,303–04 (Oct. 17, 1967) (requiring all 
entities receiving federal contracts to end discrimination based on sex in hiring and em-
ployment); Iram Valentine, Women’s Education Equity Act Resource Center, Title 
IX: A Brief History 1–2 (1997). 
27 Valentine, supra note 26, at 1–2. 
28 118 Cong. Rec. 5802–03 (1972); Cruikshank, supra note 18, at 45. Senator Bayh 
was simultaneously involved in a number of women’s rights causes, including the attempt 
to pass the Equal Rights Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Cruikshank, 
supra note 18, at 43, 45. 
29 See 118 Cong. Rec. 5808. In his speech on the Senate floor, Senator Bayh said: 
We are all familiar with the stereotype of women as pretty things who go to 
college to find a husband, go on to graduate school because they want a more 
interesting husband, and finally marry, have children, and never work again. 
The desire of many schools not to waste a “man’s place” on a woman stems 
from such stereotyped notions. But the facts absolutely contradict these myths 
about the “weaker sex” and it is time to change our operating assumptions. 
Id. at 5804. 
30 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006). 
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and frequent application.31 Most of the statute’s applicability to athlet-
ics results from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare’s 
regulations enforcing the provision.32 The DOE’s regulations that at-
tempted to clarify its interpretation of the law state that: 
No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from par-
ticipation in, be denied the benefits of, be treated differently 
from another person or otherwise be discriminated against 
in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural ath-
letics offered by a recipient, and no recipient shall provide 
any such athletics separately on such basis.33 
 Two regulations govern how Title IX is applied to athletics.34 The 
first key component, the “Equal Opportunity” provision, requires that a 
recipient of federal funds “shall provide equal athletic opportunity for 
members of both sexes.”35 The regulation lists ten factors to determine 
if the school is providing equal opportunities.36 The first, and most in-
fluential, factor requires effective accommodation of athletic interest.37 
The DOE provides that schools may use “any non-discriminatory meth-
                                                                                                                      
31 Id. § 1681; see, e.g., Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 90–91 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(finding Quinnipiac had violated Title IX by “failing to afford equal participation oppor-
tunities in varsity athletics to female students”); Mercer v. Duke Univ., 190 F.3d 643, 648 
(4th Cir. 1999) (recognizing a cause of action for a female student who had been allowed 
to try out for the university’s football team and was then discriminated against and ex-
cluded from participation); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 891 (1st Cir. 1993) (up-
holding a preliminary injunction requiring Brown to reinstate its women’s volleyball and 
gymnastics teams pending resolution of Title IX claims). 
32 See 20 U.S.C. § 1681; 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (2012). The Department of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare, is the predecessor to the current Department of Education and hereinaf-
ter, both are referred to as the “DOE.” 
33 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a). 
34 See id. § 106.41(b), (c). These regulations were implemented pursuant to the au-
thority granted to the DOE by Title IX to implement and enforce its provisions. See 20 
U.S.C. § 1681. 
35 See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c). 
36 Id. The ten listed factors are: 
(1) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively ac-
commodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes; (2) The pro-
vision of equipment and supplies; (3) Scheduling of games and practice time; 
(4) Travel and per diem allowance; (5) Opportunity to receive coaching and 
academic tutoring; (6) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors; 
(7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities; (8) Provi-
sion of medical and training facilities and services; (9) Provision of housing 
and dining facilities and services; (10) and Publicity. 
Id. 
37 See id. 
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ods” to assess athletic interest.38 The DOE then employs a three-part 
test to determine if the institution is effectively accommodating the in-
terests and abilities of athletes of different sexes.39 
 The DOE’s test provides three possible methods of compliance.40 
Institutions may demonstrate that opportunities are distributed in a 
proportional way, that athletic programs are continually expanding in 
response to the interest of members of an underrepresented sex, or 
that the interests of the members of an underrepresented sex have 
been fully accommodated by the school’s programs.41 The three-part 
test, by its terms, refers only to intercollegiate athletics.42 This test and 
its applicability to intercollegiate athletics has been the source of most 
Title IX litigation.43 
 The second provision, the “Contact Sports Exemption,” governs 
single sex teams and directly impacts field hockey and other girls’ 
contact sports such as lacrosse and basketball.44 The regulations per-
                                                                                                                      
38 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; a Policy Interpretation; Title IX and 
Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,417 (Dec. 11, 1979). 
39 Id. at 71,418. The three-part test is: 
(1) Whether inter collegiate level participation opportunities for male and 
female students are provided in numbers substantially proportionate to their 
respective enrollments; or (2) Where the members of one sex have been and 
are underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, whether the institution 
can show a history and continuing practice of program expansion which is 
demonstrably responsive to the developing interest and abilities of the mem-
bers of that sex; or (3) Where the members of one sex are underrepresented 
among intercollegiate athletes, and the institution cannot show a continuing 
practice of program expansion such as that cited above, whether it can be 
demonstrated that the interests and abilities of the members of that sex have 
been fully and effectively accommodated by the present program. 
Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 See, e.g., Biediger, 691 F.3d at 94; Cohen, 991 F.2d at 897. 
44 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2012). The regulation states: 
[A] recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for members of each sex 
where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity 
involved is a contact sport. However, where a recipient operates or sponsors a 
team in a particular sport for members of one sex but operates or sponsors 
no such team for members of the other sex, and athletic opportunities for 
members of that sex have previously been limited, members of the excluded 
sex must be allowed to try out for the team offered unless the sport involved 
is a contact sport. For the purposes of this part, contact sports include boxing, 
wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball and other sports the purpose 
or major activity of which involves bodily contact. 
Id. 
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mit single sex teams where the selection of players is based on com-
petitive skill or the activity is a “contact sport” as defined by the regu-
lations.45 Unless, however, there is both a male and a female team or a 
sport is a “contact sport,” a school must allow a member of an under-
represented sex to try out for a single sex team.46 
 Field hockey, traditionally a girl’s sport, provides an apt compari-
son for considering the application of the rule.47 For the purposes of 
discussing high school field hockey, there are two key points to con-
sider.48 First, based on case law, an underrepresented sex is one that 
has been underrepresented in the school’s athletics as a whole rather 
than in a particular sport.49 Therefore, the provision typically does not 
apply to men because they have generally not been underrepresented 
in athletics.50 Additionally, courts have interpreted the Contact Sports 
Exemption to apply to field hockey.51 As a result, under current inter-
pretation of the law, field hockey is exempt from the provisions that 
require an underrepresented sex be allowed to try out.52 These inter-
pretations mean that Title IX does not require that boys be allowed to 
try out for a girls’ field hockey team.53 
B. State Equal Rights Amendments & Their Applicability to Athletics 
 In 1976, Massachusetts voters amended the state constitution to 
include that “[e]quality under the law shall not be denied or abridged 
because of sex, race, color, creed or national origin.”54 Nineteen other 
states adopted similar provisions.55 Legislators modeled such amend-
ments after either the proposed federal ERA or the Equal Protection 
                                                                                                                      
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 See Williams v. Sch. Dist., 998 F.2d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 1993); Kleczek v. R.I. Interscho-
lastic League, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 951, 956 (D.R.I. 1991). 
48 See Williams, 998 F.2dat 174; Kleczek, 768 F. Supp. at 956. 
49 See Williams, 998 F.2d at 174; Kleczek, 768 F. Supp. at 955. 
50 See Williams, 998 F.2d at 174–75; Kleczek, 768 F. Supp. at 955; Title IX of the Educa-
tion Amendments of 1972, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,419; MIAA, 2011–2012 Athletics Partici-
pation Survey 1 (2012), http://miaa.net/gen/miaa_generated_bin/documents/basic_ 
module/completedparticipation1112.pdf [hereinafter Survey]. 
51 Kleczek, 768 F. Supp. at 955–56; see Williams, 998 F.2d at 173. 
52 See Williams, 998 F.2d at 174; Kleczek, 768 F. Supp. at 956. 
53 Kleczek, 768 F. Supp. at 956; see Williams, 998 F.2d at 174. 
54 Mass. Const. pt. 1 art. I, amended by Mass. Const. amend. CVI (1976). 
55 Gladstone, supra note 22, at 3–6. States which passed ERAs during this time period 
were Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, and Washington. 
Id. 
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.56 These changes were largely 
passed during the time the federal ERA was up for ratification.57 The 
passage of these provisions served both as support for the federal 
measure as well as a way to ensure protection at the state level.58 
 By analyzing classifications based on sex under strict rather than 
intermediate scrutiny, equal protection amendments are commonly 
interpreted to provide greater protection against sexual discrimina-
tion than those protections offered by the Fourteenth Amendment.59 
For example, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court requires the 
use of strict scrutiny for classifications based on sex, noting that: 
Our State equal rights amendment was adopted at a time 
when equal protection principles under the State and Fed-
eral Constitutions required a level of judicial scrutiny greater 
than the rational basis test but less than the strict scrutiny 
test. To use a standard in applying the Commonwealth’s 
equal rights amendment which requires any less than the 
strict scrutiny test would negate the purpose of the equal 
rights amendment and the intention of the people in adopt-
ing it.60 
Strict scrutiny requires a state action based on a suspect classification 
such as race to be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling govern-
                                                                                                                      
56 Id. The proposed federal Equal Rights Amendment stated “[e]quality of rights un-
der the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on ac-
count of sex.” H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong. (1972); see e.g. Colo. Const. art. II, § 29(1973) 
(“Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the state of Colorado 
or any of its political subdivisions because of sex.”); Haw. Const. art. I, § 3(1972) (“Equal-
ity of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the State on account of 
sex.”); Md. Const. art. 46 (1972) (Equality of rights under the law shall not be abridged or 
denied because of sex.”). The Equal Protection Clause reads: No State shall “deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 
1; see e.g. Conn. Const. art. I, § 20 (1974) (“No person shall be denied the equal protec-
tion of the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoy-
ment of his or her civil or political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry, national 
origin or sex.”) (emphasis added); Haw. Const. art. I, § 5 (1978) (“No person shall be . . . 
denied the equal protection of the laws . . . because of race, religion, sex, or ancestry.”) 
(emphasis added); La. Const. art. I, § 3 (1974) (No person shall be denied equal protec-
tion of the laws.”). Some states such as Hawaii have provisions modeled after both. Haw. 
Const. art. I, §§ 3, 5. 
57 Gladstone, supra note 22, at 3. 
58 Id. 
59 See, e.g., People v. Barger, 550 P.2d 1281, 1283 (Colo. 1976); People v. Ellis, 311 
N.E.2d 98, 101 (Ill. 1974); Commonwealth v. Butler, 328 A.2d 851, 855 (Pa. 1974). 
60 Opinion of Justices to the House of Representatives, 371 N.E.2d 426, 428 (Mass. 
1977) (citation omitted). 
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mental interest.61 Intermediate scrutiny, the constitutional analysis at 
the federal level for gender classifications, is less rigorous.62 It requires 
that the classification be substantially related to achieving an impor-
tant governmental interest.63 A number of other states have applied 
strict scrutiny to their own equal rights amendments as an added pro-
tection for women’s rights.64 
 These provisions have been used, in Massachusetts and else-
where, to allow girls to play in boys’ contact sports such as football.65 
Under Title IX, football is considered a “contact sport” and is thus 
exempt from that statute’s requirement that girls be allowed to try 
out.66 Still, the exacting scrutiny provided by state equal rights 
amendments requires a different result.67 In Massachusetts, the Su-
preme Judicial Court held that a bill banning girls from participation 
in football and wrestling: 
would violate art. 106 of the Amendments to the Constitu-
tion of the Commonwealth [ERA]. The absolute prohibition 
in the proposed legislation cannot survive the close scrutiny 
to which a statutory classification based solely on sex must be 
subjected. A prohibition of all females from voluntary par-
ticipation in a particular sport under every possible circum-
stance serves no compelling State interest.68 
Thus, states applying strict scrutiny to sex based classifications strike 
down prohibitions on girls trying out for boys’ teams, stating the ban 
lacks a compelling government interest.69 
 Massachusetts, however, has taken the exacting scrutiny for gen-
der classifications one step further by requiring that boys be allowed 
to try out for girls’ sports teams where the school does not field a 
male team in that sport.70 It is this step that sets up the conflict high-
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62 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
63 Craig 429 U.S. at 197. 
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65 Opinion of Justices to the House of Representatives, 371 N.E.2d at 430; Darrin v. Gould, 
540 P.2d 882, 893 (Wash. 1975). 
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lighted by the complaint against the MIAA filed with the OCR.71 In 
Attorney General v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Association, the 
court struck down a MIAA regulation which prohibited boys from try-
ing out for girls’ field hockey teams.72 The decision held that the Mas-
sachusetts ERA also protected men and viewed the prohibition against 
their participation in girls’ sports as a form of affirmative action which 
did not meet the rigors of strict scrutiny.73 
 Title IX and state equal right amendments were both introduced 
to prevent discrimination against women.74 Massachusetts expanded 
upon this purpose by subjecting any gender classification, even those 
designed to protect women, to strict scrutiny.75 The question then be-
comes whether the result of that strict scrutiny, that boys must be al-
lowed to try out for girls’ sports teams, creates a conflict with Title IX.76 
II. Title IX, the Massachusetts ERA, & Boys’  
Participation in Girls’ Sports 
 The analysis of boys’ participation in girls’ sports under Title IX 
hinges on two key provisions of the statute, the “Contact Sports Ex-
emption” and the “Effective Accommodation” provision.77 The “Con-
tact Sports Exemption” requires a recipient of federal funds to permit 
members of the opposite sex to try out for single sex teams under cer-
tain conditions.78 The “Effective Accommodation” provision requires 
that a recipient of federal funds take steps to meet the athletic inter-
ests of its students.79 
 If the Contact Sports Exemption applied in the context of boys’ 
participation in girls’ field hockey, there would be no conflict between 
Massachusetts law and Title IX as both would reach the same result of 
                                                                                                                      
71 See MIAA, 393 N.E.2d at 296; Cullity, supra note 1. 
72 393 N.E.2d at 296. 
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allowing boys to try out for girls’ field hockey.80 Since it does not, Mas-
sachusetts law is the sole basis for requiring boys in the state to receive 
an opportunity to participate in girls’ field hockey.81 If female athletes 
are being displaced by male athletes, Massachusetts law could conflict 
with the “Effective Accommodation” provision of Title IX.82 
A. Why Title IX Does Not Require That Boys Be Allowed to  
Try Out for Girls’ Sports 
 The DOE’s Contact Sports Exemption applies to all schools re-
ceiving federal funding that sponsor a particular sport for one sex but 
not for the other.83 The exemption requires schools to allow members 
of the excluded sex to try out for the particular sport if that sex’s ath-
letic opportunities have previously been limited.84 The requirement, 
however, does not apply if the sport at issue is a “contact sport.”85 Spe-
cifically, these regulations state that 
where a recipient [of federal funds] operates or sponsors a 
team in a particular sport for members of one sex but oper-
ates or sponsors no such team for members of the other sex, 
and athletic opportunities for members of that sex have previously 
been limited, members of the excluded sex must be allowed to 
try out for the team offered unless the sport involved is a 
contact sport.86 
Courts that have addressed this regulation have found that boys do 
not constitute a sex for which athletic opportunities have previously 
been limited and thus are ineligible for protection.87 For example, in 
Mularadelis v. Haldane Central School Board, a New York district court 
held that the requirement that athletic opportunities have been pre-
viously limited was not sport specific.88 Rather, the regulation, applied 
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to the sex’s athletic opportunities at the school as a whole.89 The court 
looked at the construction of the regulation, noting that the first part 
of the regulation uses specific and narrow language in referring to a 
“particular sport.”90 The second part of the regulation, however, uses 
more general language about athletic opportunities without reference 
to opportunities on an individual sports level.91 The court determined 
that if the DOE had meant the athletic opportunity had been limited 
for a sex in a “particular sport,” the regulation would have said so.92 
 Courts in New Hampshire and the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit have followed New York’s interpretation 
in Mularadelis.93 In Williams v. School District, a boy sued his school dis-
trict to allow him to play on the girls’ field hockey team.94 He claimed 
violations of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.95 In its decision, the Second Circuit adopted the 
Mularadelis court’s interpretation of the Contact Sports Exemption.96 
The court added that if the athletic opportunities were evaluated on 
the level of the individual sport, “there could never be a situation in a 
non-contact sport in which a team was limited to a single sex without a 
corresponding team for the other sex because, by definition, the op-
portunities in that particular sport will be limited for the excluded 
sex.”97 The court then noted that eliminating single sex teams in all 
situations where there is no corresponding team for the other gender 
would override the regulation’s purpose of allowing single sex teams 
in certain situations.98 In adopting this interpretation, the court re-
jected the interpretation of the Federal District Court of Rhode Island 
in Gomes v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League.99 In Gomes, the district 
court interpreted the athletic opportunity as applying to the individ-
ual sport, in that case volleyball.100 
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 Additionally, under Title IX, even if a boy who wanted to play 
field hockey could show that male athletic opportunities had previ-
ously been limited, he would also run into the regulation’s Contact 
Sports Exemption.101 The exemption does not require schools to al-
low members of the opposite sex to try out for a team if that sport is a 
“contact sport.”102 A contact sport is defined, by the regulations, as a 
sport “the purpose or major activity of which involves bodily con-
tact.”103 Although the regulation lists a number of contact sports, it 
neglects to name field hockey specifically.104 In Kleczek v. Rhode Island 
Interscholastic League, Inc., however, a federal district court in Rhode 
Island held that field hockey was a contact sport.105 The court consid-
ered that the rules of field hockey prohibited bodily contact, but si-
multaneously looked at requirements that the players wear protective 
equipment and testimony conceding that players do come into con-
tact with each other.106 This led the court to believe that such contact 
was inevitable.107 As a result, the court considered field hockey to be a 
“contact sport” within the meaning of the regulations.108 
 In Williams, the court considered the same issue and noted some 
of the same factors as the Kleczek court.109 It added that physical con-
tact did not have to be sanctioned under the sport’s rules to be a ma-
jor activity of that sport.110 The court noted that if contact had to be 
sanctioned by the sport to qualify as a “contact sport,” then the “pur-
pose” and “major activity” parts of the regulation would be duplica-
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tive.111 The Williams court looked favorably upon the Kleczek opinion 
that field hockey is a contact sport, but held only that the record in 
the case did not support summary judgment in favor of the proposi-
tion that field hockey was not a contact sport.112 In light of this case 
law, it can be fairly stated that Title IX does not require that boys be 
allowed to try out for girls’ teams, and that boys seeking to play girls’ 
field hockey must look to other sources of law to reach their goal.113 
B. The Massachusetts ERA & Boys Trying Out for Girls’ Sports 
 In Massachusetts, although Title IX’s criteria regarding athletic 
opportunity is determined on the factual circumstances surrounding 
the specific school, boys are unlikely to demonstrate that their athletic 
opportunities have previously been limited.114 Historically, boys have 
had greater opportunities in athletics than girls and traditional boys’ 
sports in Massachusetts often have larger rosters than girls’ teams.115 
Massachusetts, however, allows male field hockey players living in the 
state to play field hockey in high school notwithstanding Title IX.116 
In Attorney General v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Association, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court addressed the issue of whether 
the MIAA rule prohibiting boys from participating in girls’ sports vio-
lated the Massachusetts Constitution.117 It held that a categorical ban 
on male participation in girls’ high school sports violated the state’s 
equal rights amendment.118 The court’s decision made clear that un-
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der the Massachusetts ERA, players cannot be barred from participat-
ing in a sport because of their sex.119 
 In coming to that conclusion, the unanimous opinion applied a 
strict scrutiny analysis requiring that state action be narrowly tailored 
to achieve a compelling governmental interest, and specifically re-
jected a number of asserted justifications for the gender division.120 
First, the court rejected the assertion that sex served as a proxy for 
functional differences arising out of biology.121 The justices held that 
the differences between the sexes were not sufficiently clear-cut to 
justify using sex as a proxy.122 They noted that using sex as a proxy 
could possibly be justified if all boys athletically surpassed all girls, yet 
the court rejected this premise because of the increasing number of 
female athletes whose athletic abilities outstrip those of males.123 
 Next, the justices rejected the argument that the gender classifi-
cation protected the physical safety of the female players from poten-
tial injuries caused by male participants.124 They noted that previous 
decisions allowing women to play in men’s sports implicitly rejected 
this justification.125 Furthermore, the court stated that “[a]ny notion 
that young women are so inherently weak, delicate or physically in-
adequate that the state must protect them from the folly of participa-
tion in vigorous athletics is a cultural anachronism unrelated to real-
ity.”126 The need to protect female athletes from male participants in 
their sports is based on stereotypical assumptions and the court in 
MIAA required a closer fit.127 
 Finally, the justices dismissed the argument that the gender divi-
sion was necessary to protect girls’ participation in sports.128 The 
court held that this was an unnecessary use of a disfavored classifica-
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tion, namely a gender classification, when better, less offensive, alter-
natives existed.129 The court found that even if boys had an advantage 
in certain sports that would allow them to swamp female participa-
tion, it would not justify a categorical exclusion in all sports.130 Some 
sports, such as gymnastics, swimming, and riflery, may even offer ad-
vantages for female participants, in which case there would be no 
need to exclude males to protect female participation.131 
 The opinion further suggested other classifications not based on 
gender that might more appropriately protect female participation.132 
The suggestions included classifications for participation based on 
height, weight, and speed rather than gender in order to admit males 
who would not dominate competition.133 Alternatively, the court sug-
gested sports could use a handicapping approach, which would in-
hibit the ability of the most gifted players to dominate play.134 Finally, 
it noted that if boys’ participation interest in a sport became so great 
that it threatened to wash out female opportunities, creating a sepa-
rate boys’ team could solve the problem.135 Unlike Title IX which does 
not require boys to play on girls’ teams due to the Contact Sport Ex-
emption, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s interpretation 
of the state’s ERA does require that boys be provided an opportunity 
to play.136 In doing so, however, Massachusetts may run afoul of a dif-
ferent component of Title IX, namely the “Effective Accommodation 
Provision.”137 
C. Title IX Provision That Could Actually Require Gender  
Divisions in Athletics 
 The complaint filed with the OCR that Massachusetts is violating 
Title IX by allowing boys to play girls’ field hockey is likely to be de-
cided on the basis of the Effective Accommodation Provision of Title 
IX.138 Title IX’s Effective Accommodation Provision requires that re-
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cipients of federal funding “provide equal athletic opportunity for 
members of both sexes.”139 The complainants argue that if boys play 
on traditional girls’ teams, they displace girls from their usual spots 
on the team because of physiological differences.140 The complainants 
argue that displacing girls from sports teams reduces the athletic op-
portunities for women, which could create a violation of the Effective 
Accommodation Provisions of the Title IX regulations.141 
 The athletics programs of high schools must operate within the 
structures provided by Title IX.142 Thus, the DOE’s so-called “Three-
Part Test” applies to both high school and intercollegiate athletics in 
determining if athletic interests are being effectively accommodated, 
even though its terms only refer to intercollegiate athletics.143 Title IX 
applies to all recipients of federal funding, therefore local school dis-
tricts fall under that umbrella.144 Since the three-part test applies to 
high school athletics in determining whether they are effectively ac-
commodating students of both genders, schools in Massachusetts 
must comply with one of the three parts.145 
 The most common avenue educational institutions use to comply 
with the Effective Accommodation Provisions of Title IX is to meet 
the substantially proportionate opportunities provision of the three 
part test.146 The DOE has stressed that the test does not require exact 
proportionality of opportunities.147 A school with a fifty-fifty split of 
male and female students does not have to have an exact fifty-fifty split 
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of athletic opportunities.148 Instead, the three-part test allows for rea-
sonable fluctuations that occur as the result of varying interests from 
year to year.149 
 By expanding beyond the requirements of Title IX, Massachu-
setts could run afoul of the Effective Accommodation Provision of 
Title IX if boys displace girls in sufficient numbers that the opportuni-
ties for boys and girls are no longer substantially proportionate.150 For 
example, concerns were raised by the defendants in MIAA that if boys 
were not banned from girls’ sports that they would eventually come to 
overtake all the positions on the girls’ teams.151 If such a concern were 
to come to fruition, clearly the athletic interests of girls would not be 
accommodated as they would then have no opportunities for mean-
ingful athletic participation even if there were nominal “girls” 
teams.152 The complaint filed with the DOE follows a similar argu-
ment, claiming that the MIAA policy allowing boys to try out for girls’ 
teams displaces girls from participation and therefore the athletic in-
terests of girls are not effectively accommodated.153 
 These concerns, however, are largely overblown as the participa-
tion of boys in girls’ sports is a rarity with a limited impact on the abil-
ity of girls to participate in high school athletics in Massachusetts.154 
III. Why Massachusetts’ Law Regarding Boys Playing in Girls’ 
Sports Does Not Violate Title IX 
 The application of the Massachusetts ERA that allows boys to try 
out for girls’ sports does not constitute a violation of Title IX.155 Boys’ 
participation in girls’ sports only violates Title IX if it causes the par-
ticipation opportunities of girls to be disproportionately less than that 
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of boys.156 Based on the level of current male participation in girls’ 
sports, that is not the case.157 Furthermore, even if the application of 
the ERA was found to violate Title IX, this would be an undesirable 
outcome as a matter of policy.158 The inherent irony of using one stat-
ute designed to promote equality for women to invalidate a state pro-
vision aimed at the same purpose, counsels against such an applica-
tion.159 This is especially true in that the ERA interpretation is 
arguably more protective of women’s equality than the framework in 
which Title IX operates.160 
A. Application of Title IX’s Substantial Proportionality  
Requirement to Field Hockey 
 Title IX requires recipients of federal funds to provide equal ath-
letic opportunities for members of both sexes.161 One of the dominant 
factors in considering if this requirement is met is whether the sports 
the school sponsors and participation in those sports effectively ac-
commodates the interests of both sexes.162 A primary method of meet-
ing the effective accommodation provision is by showing substantially 
proportionate athletic opportunities.163 Although it is permitted in 
Massachusetts, boys’ participation in field hockey in Massachusetts is 
rare.164 Responses to the MIAA participation survey showed that in 
2011, there were 7,980 field hockey players in 215 schools playing un-
der the MIAA.165 Of those 7,980 players, only thirty were boys.166 Assum-
ing that every one of those boys took a spot that would otherwise have 
been allocated to a girl, this displacement only amounts to .01% of the 
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total girls’ participation in sports in Massachusetts and .3% of the par-
ticipation in field hockey.167 This miniscule proportion does not inter-
fere with substantial proportionality.168 Instead, these numbers easily fit 
within the periodic fluctuations in participation that do not constitute a 
violation.169 
 Even individual schools do not show evidence that boys’ partici-
pation in field hockey has swamped athletic opportunities for females, 
and in fact, in some instances the participation has been balanced out 
by girls participating in boys’ contact sports.170 The schools with the 
most male field hockey players in 2011 were Assabet Valley Regional 
Technical High School, Case High School, and Montachusett Re-
gional Vocational Tech, each with four male players.171 At Assabet Val-
ley, the imposition of boys playing in girls’ field hockey was in fact bal-
anced out by the corollary requirement of the Massachusetts ERA that 
girls be allowed to try out for boys’ sports.172 During the 2011–2012 
school year, three girls participated on the boys’ lacrosse team and 
one on the boys’ football team.173 Title IX would not have required 
that the girl be allowed to try out for the football team and likely 
would have reached the same result for lacrosse.174 At Montachusett a 
similar story is true with two girls participating in wrestling and one in 
ice hockey.175 Of the 373 schools under the MIAA umbrella, only 
eighteen had boys participating in field hockey with eighteen of the 
thirty players playing at six schools.176 
 Thus, allowing boys to participate in girls’ field hockey does not, 
in and of itself, violate the substantial proportionality requirement.177 
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The number of female participants displaced, if any, is very small.178 
Therefore, boys’ participation in field hockey alone cannot be con-
sidered to be a violation of the Effective Accommodation Provision of 
Title IX.179 
 It is also worth recognizing that while the OCR complaint is 
against MIAA, the association has a very small role in determining 
what opportunities are present at an individual school.180 The MIAA 
only sets the rules and policies that govern high school sports 
throughout the state.181 The decisions about which sports to offer and 
how athletic funds are to be spent are left to individual school dis-
tricts.182 Thus, the MIAA does not make the decisions that would ul-
timately impact participation opportunities for girls.183 Its policies 
such as allowing boys’ participation in girls’ sports only have inciden-
tal and limited effects on how female athletes are accommodated.184 
B. Policy Rationales for Interpreting the Massachusetts Equal Rights 
Amendment as Consistent with Title IX 
 The history of Title IX and the Massachusetts ERA are closely 
linked.185 Both provisions are products of the women’s rights move-
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ment.186 They share common political and intellectual proponents 
and are both aimed at providing expanded opportunity and equality 
for women within their respective scopes.187 As such, there is an in-
herent irony in using the language and interpretive regulations of Ti-
tle IX to invalidate an interpretation of a state equal rights amend-
ment that is consistent with the overarching goals of both laws.188 
 Title IX and the Massachusetts ERA were both advanced during 
the women’s rights movement in the 1970s.189 Senator Birch Bayh, 
initially introduced the federal legislation as an amendment to a 
higher education bill and was a chief proponent of the legislation.190 
In addition to acting as the chief supporter of Title IX, Senator Bayh 
was also involved in promoting the Equal Rights Amendment that 
Congress passed in 1972.191 
 Many of the equal rights amendments, including Massachusetts’ 
ERA, that were added to state constitutions during this time period 
are closely related to the national ERA and mimic its language.192 The 
passage of the state amendments was largely meant as a show of soli-
darity with the larger federal efforts.193 These amendments were de-
signed with the aim of protecting women from discriminatory treat-
ment.194 This goal is entirely consistent with the goals of Title IX.195 
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 Not only are the purposes the same, Title IX and the Massachu-
setts ERA also achieve many of the same goals.196 Both prohibit dis-
crimination against women in sports.197 They both allow women to try 
out for sports teams when the sport is not a contact sport.198 Given the 
similar goals of both laws, it would be inconsistent to allow a small dif-
ference of interpretation with a limited impact to undermine the en-
tire system of protection afforded by the Massachusetts ERA or that of 
any state which applies a strict scrutiny approach to sexual classifica-
tions.199 
 Furthermore, it is well established that states may offer greater 
protections for the civil liberties of their citizens than those afforded 
by the federal Constitution.200 With respect to Massachusetts’ ERA, it 
is arguably more protective of sexual equality than the federal Equal 
Protection Clause or Title IX.201 The Massachusetts ERA requires that 
classifications based on sex be subjected to a more rigorous examina-
tion than is required by the United States Supreme Court.202 The Su-
preme Court, however, only applies intermediate scrutiny to laws that 
utilize gender classifications, such as Title IX.203 Since Title IX oper-
ates within the federal intermediate scrutiny regime, it is arguably less 
protective of women’s equality than the Massachusetts scheme that 
                                                                                                                      
196 See Mass. Const. pt. 1, art. I; Opinion of Justices to the House of Representatives, 371 
N.E.2d at 428; 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (2012). 
197 Mass. Const. pt. 1, art. I; 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006); Opinion of Justices to the House of 
Representatives, 371 N.E.2d at 429–30 (“A prohibition of all females from voluntary partici-
pation in a particular sport under every possible circumstance serves no compelling state 
interest.”). 
198 See Opinion of Justices to the House of Representatives, 371 N.E.2d at 429–30; 34 C.F.R. § 
106.41(b). 
199 See 20 U.S.C. § 1681; MIAA, 393 N.E.2d at 296; 118 Cong. Rec. 5804 (1972). 
200 Pyle v. Sch. Comm., 667 N.E.2d 869, 872 (Mass. 1996) (“Our legislature is free to 
grant greater rights to the citizens of this Commonwealth than would otherwise be pro-
tected under the United States Constitution.”). 
201 Mass. Const. pt. 1, art. I; 20 U.S.C. § 1681; see Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 
(1984) (stating that beneficial racial classifications are “more likely to reflect racial preju-
dice than legitimate public concerns”); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (applying 
intermediate scrutiny to classifications based on sex under the federal Equal Protection 
Clause); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (stating that classifications 
based on race are inherently suspect and subject to the most rigid scrutiny); Opinion of 
Justices to the House of Representatives, 371 N.E.2d at 428 (applying strict scrutiny under the 
Massachusetts ERA to sexual classifications as protection beyond the Federal Equal Protec-
tion Clause). 
202 Craig, 429 U.S. at 197; Opinion of Justices to the House of Representatives, 371 N.E.2d at 
428. 
203 Craig, 429 U.S. at 197. 
102 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 34:77 
applies strict scrutiny.204 As such, it would be highly improper for a law 
designed to protect women’s equality to be used to invalidate a 
scheme aimed at the same goal that offers even greater protections.205 
 Although Massachusetts arguably offers greater protection 
against gender discrimination, this approach is not without negative 
consequences for girls.206 The story of Ben Menard and Corey Hedges 
stands as a reminder that although the Massachusetts ERA’s applica-
tion to field hockey may be good policy, there are certain countervail-
ing factors that may need to be addressed.207 The goal of promoting 
gender equality through the use of vigorous examination of all sex-
based classifications is a strong protection, but does come with costs.208 
Physiological differences between males and females that make the 
average male bigger, stronger, and faster than his female counterpart, 
may give a boy an inherent advantage while playing field hockey.209 
These advantages may allow boys to dominate play, as Ben Menard 
did for South Hadley, or increase the potential for injury to female 
opponents, such as the concussion suffered by Corey Hedges.210 Thus, 
there are strong policy reasons for finding alternative methods to pro-
tect safety and participation opportunities without blanket prohibi-
tions on boys’ participation in field hockey.211 
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IV. Non-Gendered Means of Protecting the Safety & 
Competitiveness of Mixed-Gender Sports 
 Eliminating gender divisions in high school athletics raises valid 
concerns regarding the negative impacts of male participation in 
women’s sports.212 Male participation may increase the potential for 
injury to female participants and could lead to male domination of 
sports where females were formerly competitive.213 Although these 
concerns are valid, they do not justify blanket gender divisions.214 
Such gender segregation is paternalistic and carries an inherent pre-
sumption that female participants need protection from male compe-
tition.215 A better approach would be to use classifications based on 
physical characteristics and an increased emphasis on multi-school 
teams.216 
A. The Need to Ensure the Safety & Competitiveness of Girls’ Sports 
 Allowing boys to participate in girls’ sports poses challenges that 
are of great concern and deserve an adequate solution.217 Chief among 
these concerns are safety and competitiveness.218 Boys are on average, 
bigger, stronger, and faster than girls and this can increase the risk of 
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injury for females playing sports with males.219 From professional to 
youth sports, head injuries, such as the concussion suffered by Corey 
Hedges, have become an increasing concern.220 Concussions can result 
in serious short and long-term symptoms.221 Repeated concussions can 
even lead to serious permanent conditions like Chronic Traumatic En-
cephalopathy (“CTE”), which can cause Parkinson’s disease, depres-
sion, and suicidal tendencies.222 The deaths of a number of professional 
athletes who suffered from CTE have highlighted the concern in re-
cent years.223 High school athletes are not immune to CTE either.224 
For example, a seventeen-year-old football player from Springhill, Kan-
sas died hours after his homecoming game after a number of concus-
sive hits to the head that had resulted in CTE.225 
 Head injuries are not the only concern.226 Other more traditional 
sports injuries such as broken bones, sprains, and torn muscles and 
ligaments can result from high school athletics and these threats are 
magnified in mixed gender sports due to the physiological disadvan-
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tages for female participants.227 In light of these grave health conse-
quences, schools must take serious steps to protect the safety of their 
student athletes.228 
 Ensuring that female athletes remain competitive within their 
chosen sport is essential.229 Title IX requires that athletes be afforded 
a real opportunity to compete and not just an “illusory” opportunity 
to participate.230 If male athletes came to dominate field hockey, the 
female participants, even if not displaced from the team, would be 
denied an effective opportunity to be competitive in the sport.231 Be-
ing relegated to sitting on the bench does not promote the goals of 
Title IX, the Massachusetts ERA, or gender equality generally.232 
B. Alternative Means of Addressing the Policy Concerns Arising from Boys’ 
Participation in Field Hockey 
 Addressing safety and competitiveness concerns in states that al-
low male participation in female sports should be done in ways other 
than following strict gender divisions.233 Alternative methods include 
placing restrictions on participants on the basis of physical character-
istics and increasing the use of multi-school teams.234 
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1. Physical Restrictions on Participation 
 One possibility for ensuring a safe and competitive environment 
for participants in high school athletics is placing limits on participa-
tion based on the physical characteristics of the athletes.235 Physical 
restrictions on the most gifted athletes in a sport would reduce inju-
ries and increase competition by eliminating or handicapping players 
who could dominate on the basis of their size, strength, and athleti-
cism.236 
 Physical restrictions could take two forms.237 First, players either 
with or without certain physical characteristics could be excluded, for 
example those who were over a certain height, weight, strength, or 
speed threshold.238 Although such criteria are inexact proxies for ath-
letic ability in a particular sport, the fact that these limitations are not 
based on a facial gender classification would help them survive consti-
tutional scrutiny.239 
 These restrictions are likely to disproportionately impact men due 
to the physiological differences in size and strength between men and 
women.240 Nevertheless, such restrictions are preferable because they 
would not constitute a blanket prohibition on male participation.241 
Smaller, slower, weaker men would be able to participate while bigger, 
faster, stronger women would be barred.242 The result would promote a 
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safe and competitive environment without using a strict gender divi-
sion.243 
 In the alternative, the state could place restrictions on partici-
pants who exceed certain physical criteria.244 In field hockey, for ex-
ample, athletically dominant players could be handicapped by re-
stricting how close they can get to the opposing goal.245 Additional 
restrictions and penalties for incidental contact with other players 
could also be implemented.246 Such rules have already been proposed 
in Massachusetts, but the proposals have been designed to apply only 
to boys, regardless of their physical ability.247 Implementing such rules 
on a gender-neutral basis, however, would prevent both conflicts with 
the state Equal Rights Amendment and avoid reinforcing gender ste-
reotypes.248 
 Despite its advantages, restricting players based on physical at-
tributes has certain practical limitations on the abilities of both boys 
and girls to participate in sports.249 Specifically, individuals with supe-
rior physical characteristics in certain sports, such as height or weight, 
might be barred from playing certain sports.250 By limiting their op-
portunities to play and showcase their athletic talent, these restric-
tions could limit the abilities of those players to earn college scholar-
ships, thus preventing them from pursuing higher education and 
earning a college degree.251 
2. Increased Use of Multi-School Teams 
 One option to avoid the negative impacts of implementing re-
strictions in high school sports on the basis of physical characteristics 
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is increasing the use of multi-school teams.252 Currently, the MIAA 
allows such teams only in very limited circumstances when a school 
does not have sufficient players on its own to field a team.253 By loos-
ening these restrictions, schools could more effectively pool together 
players to create all male teams in traditionally girls’ sports, or teams 
made up of the most physically gifted players who would be unable to 
play under the physical restrictions proposed earlier.254 
 Multi-school teams would allow schools to pool resources and 
players.255 Pooling the best players on multi-school teams has two 
benefits.256 First, by increasing the overall talent of top teams, it be-
comes less likely that boys would have a distinct advantage over their 
competition.257 Second, selecting players for top pooled teams is likely 
a more exact proxy for athletic ability than objective physical crite-
ria.258 This is due to the fact that coaches would have an incentive to 
remove physically superior players from the school’s team in order to 
make the joint team more competitive.259 Schools could share coach-
ing and equipment expenses, providing financially reasonable oppor-
tunities for the greatest number of students.260 
 The MIAA should allow schools to eschew the traditional school 
based teams where necessary and partner with surrounding schools to 
field teams that can operate effectively without utilizing gender stereo-
types.261 These teams can promote safe and competitive environments 
while meeting the needs of their students.262 This multi-school system 
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would meet the goals of both Title IX and the Massachusetts ERA.263 
The multi-school system would provide meaningful opportunities for 
the maximum number of female athletes while also promoting a safe 
environment.264 Best of all, it does so in a gender-neutral manner that 
does not rely on paternalistic protections or outdated stereotypes of 
women as the “weaker sex.”265 In doing so, this system protects gender 
equality in Massachusetts and defends against the possible negative 
consequences of boys’ participation in girls’ sports.266 
Conclusion 
 Despite reaching different results on the issue of boys playing in 
girls’ sports, Title IX and the Massachusetts ERA are laws with a com-
mon history and goal. Both laws attempt to promote gender equality, 
but have different methods of accomplishing that goal. The MIAA 
policy allowing boys to try out for girls’ field hockey does not, in and 
of itself, create a violation of Title IX. Furthermore, given their shared 
intellectual foundation and goals, Title IX should not be used to 
promote gender segregation and reinforce gender stereotypes by in-
validating an interpretation of a state ERA. Instead, potentially injuri-
ous consequences of allowing boys to play in girls’ sports should be 
controlled through non-gendered alternatives such as restrictions 
based on the physical characteristics of players or the increased use of 
multi-school teams. 
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